KAYNAKLAR

Aktan, C. C. (1991). Virginia Politik İktisat Okulunun Öğretisi: Kamu Tercihi ve Anayasal İktisat. Banka ve Ekonomik Yorumlar Dergisi, Yıl:28, sayı:11.

______________. (1994a). James M. Buchanan’ın Politik İktisada Katkıları. Türkiye Günlüğü, 26:39-49.

______________. (1994b). Çağdaş Liberal Düşüncede Politik İktisat. Takav Matbaası: Ankara.

______________. (1996). Ekonomik Anayasa. TİSK İnceleme Yayını, İstanbul.

______________. (1997). Anayasal İktisat ve Ekonomik Anayasa. İz Yayıncılık: 232, İstanbul.

______________. (1999a). Demokrasi, Liberalizm ve Sınırlı Devlet. Yeni Türkiye Dergisi, 25: 142-145.

______________. (1999b). 21. Yüzyıl ve Anayasal Demokrasi. Yeni Türkiye Dergisi, 29: 600-606.

______________. (1999c). “Ideas Do Have Consequences”,             http://www.gmu.edu/jbc/fest/files/aktan.htm, 30.12.1999.

Arrow, K.J. (1951). Social Choice and Individual Values. New York.

Atkinson, A. B. (1987). James Buchanan’s Contributions to Economics. Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 89 (1): 5-15.

Baird, C. W. (1989). James Buchanan and the Austrians: The Common Ground. Cato Journal, 9(1): 211-30.

Barro, R.J. (1974). Are Government Bonds Net Wealth?, Journal of Political Economy, 82: 1095-1118.

Barro, R.J. (1979). On the Determination of the Public Debt, Journal of Political Economy, 87: 940-971.

Barry, N. P. (1984). Unanimity, Agreement and Liberalism: A Critique of James Buchanan’s Social Philosophy. Political Theory, 12 (4): 579-96.

Black, D. (1948). On the Rational of Group Decision Making. Journal of Political Economy, 56.

Boettke, Peter J. (1998). James M. Buchanan And The Rebirth Of Political Economy. in: Ric Holt and Steven Pressman, eds., Economics and Its Discontent: Dissent in 20th Century Economics, Edward Elgar Publishing.

Brennan, G. (2000). Onwards and Upwards: James Buchanan at 80. Public Choice, 104: 1-18.

Broadway, R. & Flatters F. R. (1982). Equalization in a Federal State: An Economic Analysis. Ottowa: Economic Council of Canada.

Buchanan, J. M. (1949). The Pure Theory of Government Finance: A Suggested Approach. Journal of Political Economy, 57: 496-505.

______________. (1950). Federalism and Fiscal Equity. American Economic Review, 40: 583-99.

______________. (1951). Knut Wicksell on Marginal Cost Pricing. Southern Economic Journal, 17: 173-78.

______________. (1954a). Individual Choice in Voting and the Market. Journal of Political Economy, 62: 334-43.

______________. (1954b). Social Choice, Democracy, and Free Markets. Journal of Political Economy, 62: 114-23.

______________. (1958). Public Principles of Public Debt. Homewood: Richard D. Irwin.

______________. (1959). Positive Economics, Welfare Economics and Political Economy. Journal of Law and Economics, 2: 124-38.

______________. (1960a). La Scienza delle finanze: The Italian Tradition in Fiscal Theory," in: Fiscal Theory and Political Economy: 24-74.

______________. (1960a). Fiscal Theory and Political Economy. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.

______________. (1960b). The Public Finances. Homewood: Richard D. Irwin.

______________. (1961). Simple Majority Voting, Game Theory, and Resource Use. Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science, 27: 337-48.

______________. (1962a) The Relevance of Pareto Optimality. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 6: 341-54.

______________. (1962b). Politics, Policy, and the Pigovian Margins. Economica, 29: 17-28.

______________. (1963). The Economics of Earmarked Taxes. Journal of Political Economy, 71: 457-69.

______________. (1964). Fiscal Institutions and Efficiency in Collective Outlay. American Economic Review, 54: 227-35.

______________. (1965a). An Economic Theory of Clubs. Economica, 32: 1-14.

______________. (1965b). Ethical Rules, Expected Values, and Large Numbers. Ethics, 76: 1-13.

 ______________. (1966a). Public Finance in Democratic Process: Fiscal Institutions and Individual Choice. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.

______________. (1966b). Externality in Tax Response. Southern Economic Journal, 33: 35-42.

______________. (1966c). Monetary and Fiscal Policies for Economic Growth in a Free Society. Politico, 31: 801-07.

______________. (1967a). Fiscal Policy and Fiscal Preference. Papers on Non-Market Decision Making, 1: 1-10.

______________. (1967b). Politics and Science: Reflections on Knight's Critique of Polanyi. Ethics, 77: 303-10.

______________. (1967c). Public Goods in Theory and Practice. Journal of Law and Economics, 10:193-97.

______________. (1968). Demand and Supply of Public Goods. Chicago: Rand-McNally.

______________. (1969). Cost and Choice: An Inquiry in Economic Theory. Chicago: Markham Publishing Co.

______________. (1970). Notes on the Economic Theory of Socialism. Public Choice, 8: 29-43.

______________. (1973). The Coase Theorem and the Theory of the State. Natural Resources Journal, l3: 579-94.

______________. (1975a). The Limits of Liberty: Between Anarchy and Leviathan. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

______________. (1975b). Public Finance and Public Choice. National Tax Journal, 28: 383-94.

______________. (1975c). Utopia, The Minimal State, and Entitlement. Public Choice, 23: 121-26.

______________. (1975d). A Contractarian Paradigm for Applying Economic Theory. American Economic Review, 65: 225-30.

______________. (1976c). Barro on the Ricardian Equivalence Theorem. Journal of Political Economy, 83: 337-42.

______________. (1976a). Taxation in Fiscal Exchange. Journal of Public Economics, 6: 17-29.

______________. (1976b). The Justice of Natural Liberty. Journal of Legal Studies, 5: 1-16.

______________. (1977). Freedom in Constitutional Contract: Perspectives of a Political Economist. College Station: Texas A & M University Press.

______________. (1978). Markets, States, and the Extent of Morals. American Economic Review, 68: 364-68.

______________. (1979a). What Should Economists Do? Indianapolis, Indiana: Liberty Press.

______________. (1979b). Constitutional Constraints on Governmental Taxing Power. ORDO, Band 30, (Stuttgart: Gustav Fischer Verlag): 334-59.

______________. (1979c). Politics without Romance: A Sketch of Positive Public Choice Theory and Its Normative Implications, Inaugural Lecture, Institute for Advanced Studies, Vienna, Austria, IHS Journal, Zeitschrift des Instituts für Höhere Studien, 3: B1-B11.

______________. (1981). Revenue Implications of Money Creation Under Leviathan. American Economic Review,  71: 347-51.

______________. (1983a). The Public Choice Perspective. Economia delle scelte pubbliche, 1: 7-15.

______________. (1983b). Rent-Seeking, Non-Compensated Transfers, and Laws of Secession. Journal of Law and Economics, 26: 71-86.

______________. (1983c) The Achievement and Limits of Public Choice in Diagnosing Government Failure and in Offering Bases for Constructive Reform. in: Anatomy of Government Deficiencies, ed. Horst Hanusch (Berlin: Springer-Verlag), 15-26.

 ______________. (1984). The Ethical Limits of Taxation. Scandanavian Journal of Economics, 86: 102-14.

______________. (1985a). Constitutional Democracy, Individual Liberty, and Political Equality. Jahrbuch für neue Politische Ökonomie Band 4: 35-47.

______________. (1985b). The Moral Dimension of Debt Financing. Economic Inquiry 23: 1-6.

______________. (1986a). Better Than Plowing. Banca Nazionale del Lavoro Quarterly Review, 159: 359-75.

______________. (1986b). Liberty, Market, and State: Political Economy in the 1980s. Brighton, England: Wheatsheaf Books.

______________. (1986c) The Economic Consequences of the Deficit. Scelte pubbliche 4: 149-56.

______________. (1987a). The Constitution of Economic Policy. American Economic Review, 77: 243-50.

______________. (1987b). Tax Reform as Political Choice. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 1: 29-35.

______________. (1987c) Towards the Simple Economics of Natural Liberty: An Exploratory Analysis. Kyklos, 40: 3-20.

______________. (1988a). Contractarian Political Economy and Constitutional Interpretation. AEA Papers and Proceedings, 78 (2): 135-39.

______________. (1988b). Is Public Choice Immoral? Virginia Law Review, 74: 179-89.

______________. (1988c). Market Failure and Political Failure. Cato Journal, 8:    1-14.

______________. (1989a). Essays on the Political Economy. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press.

______________. (1989b). Nobelity. Eastern Economic Journal, 15: 339-48.

______________. (1989c). Reductionist Reflections on the Monetary Constitution. The Cato Journal, 9 (2): 295-99.

______________. (1990a) The Domain of Constitutional Economics. Constitutional Political Economy, 1:1-18.

______________. (1990b). Born Again Economist. Lives of the Laureates: Ten Nobel Economists, ed. William Breit. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

______________. (1990c). Socialism Is Dead But Leviathan Lives. Wall Street Journal, 18 July.

______________. (1991a). Constitutional Economics. IEA Masters of Modern Economics Series, Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

______________. (1991b). An American Perspective on Europe's Constitutional Opportunity. Cato Journal, 10 (3): 619-29.

______________. (1991c). Economics in the Post-Socialist Century. The Economic Journal, 101: 15-21.

______________. (1991d). The Minimal Politics of Market Order. Cato Journal Special Issue, (2): 215-26.

______________. (1992). Public Choice after the Revolutions: 1989-91, Economia delle scelte pubbliche, 2 (3): 93-101.

______________. (1993) The Political Efficiency of General Taxation. National Tax Journal, 46 (4): 401-411.

______________. (1994a). Notes on the Liberal Constitution. Cato Journal, 14 (1): 1-9.

______________. (1994b). The Political Efficiency of General Taxation. National Tax Journal, 46 (4): 401-10.

______________. (1994c). Ethics and Economic Progress. Norman. Ok.: University of Oklahoma Press.

______________. (1995a). Clarifying Confusion About the Balanced Budget Amendment. National Tax Journal, 48 (3): 347-55.

______________. (1995b). Economic Science and Cultural Diversity. Kyklos, 48 (2): 193-200.

______________. (1995c). Federalism As an Ideal Political Order and an Objective for Constitutional Reform. Publius, 25: 19-27.

______________. (1995d). Individual Rights, Emergent Social States, and Behavioral Feasibility. Rationality and Society, 7: 141-50.

______________. (1996a). Federalism and Individual Sovereignty. Cato Journal, 15:259-68.

______________. (1996b). Economic Freedom and Federalism: Prospects for the New Century. Asian Journal of Business & Information Systems, 1: 5-10.

______________. (1997). Post Socialist Political Economy: Selected Essays. Edward Elgar.

______________. (1999). The Logical Foundation of Constitutional Liberty. Liberty Fund, Inc.

Buchanan, J. M. &  Tullock, G. (1962). The Calculus of Consent: Logical Foundations of Constitutional Democracy. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

Buchanan, J. M. & Brennan, G. (1977). Towards a Tax Constitution for Leviathan, Journal of Public Economics, 8: 255-73.

______________. (1979). The Logic of Tax Limits: Alternative Constitutional Constraints on the Power to Tax, National Tax Journal, 32: 11-22.

______________. (1980). The Power to Tax: Analytical Foundations of a Fiscal Constitution. New York: Cambridge University Press.

______________. (1981). Monopoly in Money and Inflation: The Case for a Constitution to Discipline Government, Hobart Paper 88. London: Institute of Economic Affairs.

______________. (1985). The Reason of Rules - Constitutional Political Economy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Buchanan, J. M. & Bush, W. C. (1974). Political Constraints on Contractual Redistribution.  American Economic Review, 64: 153-57.

Buchanan, J. M. & Congleton, R. D. (1998). Politics by Principal, Not Interest. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Buchanan, J. M. & Forte F. (1964). Fiscal Choice Through Time: A Case for Indirect Taxation? National Tax Journal, 17: 144-57.

Buchanan, J. M. & Goetz, C. J. (1972). Efficiency Limits of Fiscal Mobility. Journal of Public Economics, 1: 25-43.

Buchanan, J. M. & Lee, D. R. (1982a). Tax Rates and Tax Revenues in Political Equilibrium: Some Simple Analytics. Economic Inquiry, 20: 344-54.

______________. (1982b). Politics, Time, and the Laffer Curve. Journal of Political Economy, 90: 816-19.

______________. (1994). On a Fiscal Constitution for the European Union. Journal des Economistes et des Etudes Humaines, 5 (2/3): 219-32.

Buchanan, J. M. & Musgrave, R. (1999). Public Finance and Public Choice: Two Contrasting Visions of the State. The MIT Press.

Buchanan, J. M. & Pauly, M. (1970). On the Incidence of Tax Deductibility. National Tax Journal, 23: 157-67.

Buchanan, J. M. & Tollison, R. D. (1972). Theory of Public Choice: Political Applications of Economics. eds. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

______________. (1984). The Theory of Public Choice–II. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

Buchanan, J. M. & Vanberg, V.(1988). Rational Choice and Moral Order. Analyse & Kritik, 10: 138-60.

Buchanan, J. M. & Wagner, R. E. (1967). Public Debt in a Democratic Society. American Enterprise Institute.

______________. (1977). Democracy in Deficit: The Political Legacy of Lord Keynes. New York: Academic Press.

Buchanan, J. M. & Yoon, J. Y. (1994). The Return to Increasing Returns. eds., Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

______________. (1995). Rational Majoritarian Taxation of the Rich: With Increasing Returns and Capital Accumulation. Southern Economic Journal, 61(4): 923-935.

Buchanan, J. M., Tollison, R. D. & Vanberg V. J. (1987). Economics: Between Predictive Science and Moral Philosophy. College Station: Texas A & M University Press.

______________. (1989). Explorations into Constitutional Economics. Eds., College Station: Texas A & M University Press.

Buchanan, J. M., Tollison, R. D., & Rowley, R. (1987). Deficits. New York: Blackwell.

Buchanan, J. M., Tollison, R. D., & Tullock, G. (1980). Toward a Theory of the Rent Seeking Society. College Station: Texas A&M University Press.

Bulutoğlu, K. (1988). Kamu Ekonomisine Giriş. Filiz Kitabevi, İstanbul.

Congleton, R. D. (1999). “Buchanan and The Virginia School”, http://www.gmu.edu/jbc/fest/files/congleton.htm, 30.12.1999.

Çelebi, Kemal (2000). Kamu Ekonomisi Analizi: Kamu Ekonomisinin Büyüklüğü Sorunu, Emek Matbaası.

Da Empoli, Domenico (1999). “Buchanan’s Contributions: An Italian Viewpoint”, http://www.gmu.edu/jbc/fest/files/daempoli.htm, 30.12.1999.

Dragun, A. K.& O'Connor, M. P. (1993). Property Rights, Public Choice, and Pigovianism.  Journal of Post Keynesian Economics. 16 (1):127-152.

Durden G. C. & Millsaps, S. W. (1996). James Buchanan’s Contribution to Social and Economic Thought: Citation Courts, Self-Assessment, and Peer Review. Constitutional Political Economy, 7: 133-151.

Eker Aytaç & Aktan C. C. (1991). Kamu Tercihi ve Anayasal İktisat (James M. Buchanan’dan Çeviriler). Aklıselim Matbaası, İzmir.

Forte, F. (1999). “Buchanan’s Increasing Return Multiplier”, http://www.gmu.edu/jbc/fest/files/forte.htm, 30.12.1999.

Hansjürgens, B. (2000). The Influence of Knut Wicksell on Richard Musgrave and James Buchanan. Public Choice, 113: 95-116.

Hayek, F. A. (1960).   The Constitution of Liberty, University of Chicago Press. Chicago: Rautledge-Kagan Paul.

Holcombe, R. G. (1998).   Tax Policy From Public Choice Perspective. National Tax Journal,  51 (2): 359-374.

İnce, Macit. (1976). Devlet Borçlanması. Kalite Matbaası-Ankara.

Kliemt, Hartmut. (1990). Papers on Buchanan and Related Subjects. Studies in Economics and Social Science (SESS), 1: 9-36.

Locksley, G. (1981). Individuals, Contracts and Constitutions; The Poltical Economy of James M. Buchanan. in: J. R. Shockleton and Gareth Locksley, Twelve Contemporary Economists, Macmillian Press Ltd.

Mieszkowski, P. & Musgrave, R. A. (1999) Federalism, Grants, and Fiscal Equalization. National Tax Journal, 52 (2): 239-261.

Nadaroğlu, H. (1998). Kamu Maliyesi Teorisi. Beta Basın Yayım Dağıtım, 10. Baskı.

Pigou, A. C. (1928). A Study in Public Finance. Macmillan London.

Rawls, J. (1971). A Theory of Justice. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.

Region (1995). Interview With James Buchanan. Region, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.

Reisman, D. (1990). The Political Economy of James Buchanan. College Station, Texas A&M Press.

Reynolds, Noel B. (1999). “Preto Optimality and Rule of Law”, http://www.gmu.edu/jbc/fest/files/reynolds.htm, 30.12.1999.

Romer, C. K. (1987). Nobel Laureate: On James Buchanan’s Contributions to Public Economics. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 2:165-79.

Rowley, C. K. (1987). The Economic Philosophy of James McGill Buchanan. Economic Della Scelte Pubbliche, 3: 172-87.

______________. (1993). Public Choice Theory. eds Edward Elgar Publishing Company.

______________. (1999). Five Market-Friendly Nobelists. Independence Review, 3 (3): 413-422.

Samuelson, P. (1954). A Pure Theory of Public Expenditures. Review of Economics and Statistics, 36: 387–389.

Sandmo, A. (1990). Buchanan on Political Economy: A Review Article. Journal of Economic Literature, 28 (1): 50-56.

Savaş, Vural F. (1997). Anayasal İktisat, Genişletilmiş 3. Baskı, Avcıol Basım Yayım, İstanbul.

Szanberg,  M. (1992). Eminent Economists. Cambridge University Press.

Şener, Orhan. (2001). Teori ve Uygulamada Kamu Ekonomisi. Beta Basım Yayım, 7. Baskı, İstanbul.

Tullock, G. (1987). Public Choice. in: The New Polgrave Dictonary of Economics. London: The Macmillan.

Vaughn, K. I & Wagner, R. E. (1992). Public Debt Controversies: An Essay in Reconciliation. Kyklos, 45 (1):37-50.

Yayla, A. (1993). Özgürlük Yolu: Hayek’in Sosyal Teorisi. Turhan Kitapevi, Ankara.